



Analysis on APT 36

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

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Executive Summary

Athenian Tech analyzed the APT36 cyber threat. APT36 is a Pakistan-based Cyber Threat group that targets Indian military and diplomatic entities first seen in 2013. The group uses honey trapping techniques to lure their target to collect information like macro-based documents and embedding executable files within zip files. The group uses Crimson RAT to steal data and perform cyber-espionage activities. The RAT comprises a variety of exfiltration functions.

Athenian Tech analyzed this group's espionage efforts to steal personal data from military personnel using honey traps. The APT goes by other names like Transparent Tribe, ProjectM, Mythic Leopard, Operation C-Major. The APT group is observed to use the Andromeda botnet. Apart from India, similar activities of the APT group are seen in Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech, Germany, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, USA. The group uses various tools to perform its malicious activities like Amphibian, Android RAT, beendoor, Bezigate, Bozok, BreachRAT, Crimson RAT, DarkComet, Luminosity RAT, Mobzsar, MumbaiDown, njRAT, ObliqueRAT, Peppy RAT, QuasarRAT, SilentCMD, Stealth Mango, UPDATESEE, USBWorm, Waissar RAT.

The group is expanding its arsenal with a new Windows malware – ObliqueRAT. To achieve its goals, the APT group fake domains masquerading as legitimate sites of Indian defence and government related websites or lure victims to malicious content-hosting websites.



Targeting Sector

The APT36 group, also known as Transparent Tribe, primarily targets military and defence personnel (Figure 1) but is expanding its targeting to diplomatic entities, defence contractors, research organizations, and conference attendees. The group uses a variety of tailored themes to lure their targets. The APT group used honeytrap-themed lures to trick victims into opening ZIP archives and maldocs, military and defence-themed maldocs to distribute CrimsonRAT. These maldocs masqueraded as logistical and operational documents for the Indian Armed Forces (Figure 2). The group used RAR archives to target diplomatic entities, CrimsonRAT maldoc as the agenda for the conference (Figure 3). The group is reportedly using maldocs content similar to the themes of Indian government-sponsored conferences to lure victims.

The spying application SmeshApp infected the personal computers of the Air Force, Navy, Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Industrial Security Forces by stealing their stored information, tracked movements, phone calls, messages and even photographs. The group was even lured through fake Facebook profiles.




Figure 1: The attached *Guidelines.xlam* is a maldoc used as a spear-phishing email to defence personnel




Figure 2: Spear-phishing email to defence advisors



Figure 3: Maldoc impersonating as the agenda for the conference

The APT group used various honey trap maldocs to lure victims to download files like sending malicious CV (Figure 4) or deliver CrimsonRAT executables in the form of honeytrap-themed icons (Figure 5).

Sunita Singh

Email:

Address:

OBJECTIVE

Seeking the position of Elementary English Teacher in a progressive institution to apply my strong knowledge of the subject and help students attain their highest potential.

Education: Study Program

Institution/Place of Education

Personal Informational

Figure 4: Honeytraps maldocs



Figure 5: CrimsonRAT executables

Pakistan-linked APT36 is using decoy health advisory to spread CrimsonRAT malware. Some of the functionalities of the CrimsonRAT are stealing credentials from the victim's browsers, capturing screenshots, collecting installed anti-virus details, reading processes, drives, and folders on the victim machine. The attached macro documents exploited the CVE-2017-0199, which executes Visual Basic script when the victim opens the malicious document. The attackers spread the maldoc through a spearphishing email labelled as a health advisory (Figure 6) about the coronavirus and pretends to be from the Government of India.

When the victim opens the attached malicious document and enables macros, the CrimsonRAT function starts. The RAT creates two directories - "Eldacar" and "Uahaiws". Then the RAT detects the OS version installed and downloads the 32-bit or 64-bit version of the RAT in zip format in the Uahaiws directory and extracts the content in the Eldacar directory. The RAT calls the shell function to execute the payload and connects to a hardcoded Command and Control (C2) server at IP address 107.175.64[.]209 or 64.188.25[.]205 to send collected victim information to the server.




Figure 6: Phishing Document that contains malicious macro code

Targeting Country

APT36 is believed to be of Pakistan origin group that mainly targets the Government of India and performs cyber-espionage activities against the defence personnel, embassies, diplomatic entities, defence contractors, and research organizations. Apart from India, similar activities of the APT group are reported in Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech, Germany, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, USA.

Cyber Espionage Activity

An android app – SmeshApp (Figure 7), collected information about Indian army personnel in 2016 and is attributed to the work of the APT36 group. Google eventually removed the application from its Playstore. Operation C-Major targeted Indian military officials via spear-phishing emails and used Adobe Reader vulnerability to distribute spyware. In 2017, the APT36 group impersonated the Indian think tank "Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)" and sent spear-phishing emails to the Indian Army and the CBI officials.




Figure 7: SmeshApp malicious application

Technical Analysis

APT36 uses various tools like Andromeda, beendoor, Bezigate, Bozok, BreachRAT, Crimson RAT, DarkComet, Luminosity RAT, njRAT, Peppy Trojan and UPDATES. The group set up fake blogs to lure Indian military officials. The site intribune.blogspot[.]com is set up by the malicious actors infected by the MSIL/Crimson, njRAT and other malware. The group posted luring articles to conduct their malicious activities (Figure 8)



Figure 8: Fake articles to lure victims

When one clicks on Read More, a maldoc is downloaded on the victim device and installs njRAT malware. The group used email campaigns to deliver Crimson RAT payloads like using Pathankot Attack name to lure military personnel (Figure 9).




Figure 9: Email campaigns in the name of "Pathankot Attack" to lure military personnel. The file contains MSIL/Crimson payloads.

Analysis of Crimson RAT

Crimson RAT is a modular payload that downloads additional payloads to perform keylogging, credential theft from browsers, automatic searching, and stealing files on removable devices. The first stage of the Crimson is to download all the additional modules to make itself a more featured RAT. The C&C responds to the requests of the Crimson RAT to download additional payloads. Crimson uses a custom TCP protocol to communicate with the C&C server. Crimson is using webcams to spy on the victims, stealing email from Outlook, and recording the victim's screen. Some Crimson RAT variants support 40 commands to spy and exfiltrate data.

Modules of Crimson

URLDownload: This module first checks for the existence of the registry key - "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\ CurrentVersion\last_edate", the module creates new keys if it does not exist. The module has a downloader logic to wait for at least 15 days and then send HTTP GET Requests to a hardcoded location to fetch a text file. The text file contains the HTTP location of the final payload, which is likely a compromised website.

SecApp: This module supports info, upsects, and upmain commands that allows the controller to modify the path and application names for secApp. An initial beacon is sent to the C&C server with a different port number.

Credential Stealer: This module downloads saved credentials from different browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, and Opera browsers and stores the credentials like "%APPDATA%\Roaming\chrome\chrome_update".

Keylogger: It is a basic keylogger that stores key logs in a file name "nvidia" in "%APPDATA%\NVIDIA\" location.

USB Module: This module searches for potential interesting information and copies it to the local disk. It searches for different types of extensions mentioned in the below figure.

```
SYNC_RULES_CONFIG = {'HOME': r'(^.*pdf$ or ^.*txt$ or ^.*doc$ or ^.*xls$ or ^.*ppt$ or ^.*mdb$ or ^.*dmg$ or ^.*dxf$ or ^.*dbs$ ^)',  
  'FIXED': r'(^.*pdf$ or ^.*doc$ or ^.*xls$ or ^.*ppt$ or ^.*mdb$ or ^.*dmg$ or ^.*dbs$ ^)',  
  'REMOVABLE': r'(^.*size < 5 mb if (^.*.jpg$ or ^.*.jpeg$ or ^.*.avi$) else (size < 100 mb and (^.*pdf$ or ^.*txt$ or ^.*doc$ or ^.*xls$ or ^.*ppt$ or ^.*mdb$ or ^.*dmg$ or ^.*dxf$)))$')}
```

Peppy Module: A Python-based module for automatic exfiltration of potential files and keylogs. Files are extracted using HTTP POST requests (Figure 10). Peppy also uses the same set of extensions of the USB Module for search parameters.



Figure 10: Peppy POST Request to exfiltrate data.

The malware authors exploited the CVE-2012-0158, a vulnerability in the Windows common controls that allows remote code execution when a user visits a malicious website crafted to exploit the vulnerability. The malicious word file uses a shellcode that searches and decodes the executable payload. This payload resides in the memory. The shellcode then proceeds to save the payload and calls WinExec to exploit the payload. The payload is written in C++.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Below is the list of indicators that can be used to identify the activities of the APT group. These are the forensic data found on the infected systems. The list of IoCs includes malicious domains and generic-themed domains, URLs, IP addresses used by the APT36 group. The IoCs also includes hashes of the RATs, maldocs, and associated email addresses.

Malicious Domains

Domains with specific themes:

clawsindia[.]com
 mail[.]clawsindia[.]com
 larsentobro[.]com
 millitarytocorp[.]com
 7thpcupdates[.]info
 india[.]gov[.]in[.]attachments[.]downloads[.]7thpcupdates[.]info
 email[.]gov[.]in[.]attachment[.]drive[.]servicesmail[.]site
 tprlink[.]com
 armypostal-service[.]com
 isroddp[.]com
 mail[.]isroddp[.]com

pmailindia[.]com
mailer[.]pmailindia[.]com
mailout[.]pmailindia[.]com
email[.]gov[.]in[.]maildrive[.]email

Generic Themed Domains

urservices[.]net
drivestransfer[.]com
emailhost[.]network
mediacLOUDS[.]live
mediabox[.]live
mediafiles[.]live
mediaflix[.]net
mediadrive[.]cc
hostflix[.]live
shareflix[.]co
studioflix[.]net
social.medialinks[.]cc
share.medialinks[.]cc
servicesmail[.]site
filelinks[.]live
file-attachment[.]com
mediashare[.]cc
shareone[.]live
cloudsbox[.]net
filestudios[.]net
dataCyncorize[.]com
templatesmanagersync[.]info
digiphotostudio[.]live
onedrives[.]cc
sharingmymedia[.]com
awsyscloud[.]com
shareboxs[.]net
maildrive.email
sharemydrives[.]com
newsupdates.myftp[.]org
bjorn111.duckdns[.]org
tgservermax.duckdns[.]org
systemsupdated.duckdns[.]org
vmd41059.contaboserver.net
vmi433658.contaboserver.net
micrsoft[.]ddns.net

URLs

hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/files/Officers-Posting-2021.doc
hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/files/Special-Services-Allowance-Armd-Forces.xlam
hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/myfiles/Dinner%20Invitation.doc/win10/Dinner%20Invitation.doc
hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/files/Parade-2021.xlam
hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/files/Age-Review-of-Armd-Forces.doc
hxxp://drivestransfer[.]com/files/My-Resume-Detail.doc
hxxps://emailhost[.]network/National-Conference-2021
hxxp://mediaclouds[.]live/files/cnics.zip
hxxp://mediaclouds[.]live/files/attachment.zip
hxxp://mediabox[.]live/anita-resume4
hxxp://mediabox[.]live/files/nisha-resume-2020.zip
hxxp://mediafiles[.]live/files/my%20fldr%20for%20u%20diensh.zip
hxxp://mediafiles[.]live/files/for%20u%20krishna%20my%20pic%20and%20video%20fldr.zip
hxxp://mediafiles[.]live/files/khushi%20pics%20all.zip
hxxps://mediafiles[.]live/aditii
hxxps://mediaflix[.]net/BHC-PR
hxxp://mediaflix[.]live/files/skype-lite.apk
hxxp://mediadrive[.]cc/?a=W1549544649I
hxxp://mediadrive[.]cc/?a=W1550558721I&fbclid=IwAR1PzHnHCOjDqfpqaBqxnY4o1xMX6ibdgXACo
mUmJuHFYHgtCBHFq5NIYug
hxxp://hostflix[.]live/files/my_new_pic.zip
hxxp://shareflix[.]co/files/lkgame.apk
hxxp://shareflix[.]co/larina-circulum-vetae-complete-2020
hxxps://studioflix[.]net/my-social
hxxp://social.medialinks[.]cc/files/scan0001.rar
hxxp://social.medialinks[.]cc/Case-Detail
hxxp://social.medialinks[.]cc/my-100-pics
hxxp://social.medialinks[.]cc/files/hot_song.rar
hxxp://email.gov.in.attachment.drive.servicesmail[.]site/files/Coast%20Guard%20HQ%2010.rar
hxxps://email.gov.in.attachment.drive.servicesmail[.]site/New-Projects-List
hxxp://filelinks[.]live/files/Note%20Verbal.doc
hxxp://filelinks[.]live/Details-and-Invitations
hxxp://file-attachment[.]com/files/fauji%20india%20september%202019.xls
hxxp://file-attachment[.]com/files/pfp-73rd%20independence%20day%20gallantry%20awards%20.xls
hxxp://mediashare[.]cc/?a=W1551315913I
hxxps://shareone[.]live/New-sonam-cv1
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/new%20cv.zip
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/new%20preet%20sharma.zip

hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/preet.doc
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/sonam%20karwati.zip
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/nisha%20arora%20sharma.zip
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/cv%20ssss.zip
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/sonamkarwati.exe
hxxps://cloudsbox[.]net/files/sonam
hxxps://cloudsbox[.]net/My-Pic
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/sonam%20karwati.exe
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/files/sonam
hxxps://cloudsbox[.]net/sonam-karwati5
hxxp://cloudsbox[.]net/sonam11
hxxp://filestudios[.]net/files/Nisha%20Doc.doc
hxxps://filestudios[.]net/Sunita-Singh1.html
hxxp://filestudios[.]net/files/sonam%20cv.zip
hxxp://templatesmanagersync[.]info/essa.dotm
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hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/recordsdata/Standards-of-Military-Officers.doc
hxxps://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/1More-details.doc
hxxp://sharingmymedia[.]com/files/Criteria-of-Army-Officers.doc
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hxxps://sharingmymedia[.]com/myfiles/Immediate%20Message.docm/Unknown%20OS
%20Platform/I
mmediate%20Message.docm
hxxps://7thpcupdates[.]info/downloads/7thPayMatrix.xls
hxxp://armypostalservice[.]com/myfiles/file.doc/win7/file.doc
hxxp://isroddp[.]com/rEmt1t_pE7o_pe0Ry/hipto.php
hxxp://newsupdates[.]myftp.org/lee/vbc.exe

IP Addresses

23[.]254.119.11
64[.]188.12.126
64[.]188.25.232
75[.]119.139.169
95[.]168.176.141
107[.]175.64.209
107[.]175.64.251
151[.]106.14.125
151[.]106.19.218
151[.]106.56.32
162[.]218.122.126
164[.]68.101.194
167[.]114.138.12
167[.]160.166.177
173[.]212.192.229
173[.]212.226.184
173[.]212.228.121
173[.]249.14.104
173[.]249.50.57
176[.]107.177.54
178[.]132.3.230
181[.]215.47.169
185[.]117.73.222
185[.]136.161.124
185[.]136.163.197
185[.]136.169.155
185[.]174.102.105
185[.]183.98.182
192[.]99.241.4
193[.]111.154.75
198[.]46.177.73
198[.]54.119.174
206[.]81.26.164
207[.]154.248.69
209[.]127.16.126
212[.]8.240.221
216[.]176.190.98

Hashes

Maldocs

662c3b181467a9d2f40a7b632a4b5fe5ddd201a528ba408badbf7b2375ee3553
9072e1af4382183be07719286f8017f6eddd9460b2e6f8a47fb042ec17aeb569
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RATs

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08b8ab37fd019b2c9d33d278eeaa16e9c50ed4c7c66ef7202eb0537ec9465a07
26e79b8af50583503b0c6bb5dc3e430ca9fdeff1e4c809ca5fea0057de7470e0

Associated Malicious Email IDs

pmaymis-mhupa[at]pmayindia[.]com
vikaskumar[.]patel[at]larsentobro[.]com
larsento[at]larsentobro[.]com

Recommendations

- To protect against RATs, consider a real-time malware detection endpoint solution.
- Keep all software (including Microsoft Word and Excel) up-to-date.
- Train employees against social engineering and spear-phishing attacks to avoid opening documents from unvetted sources.
- Advise employees to contact health advisory to ensure that the emails are legitimate and aware of phishing campaigns using Coronavirus baits.
- In case of malware detection, immediately disconnect infected computers from LAN/internet to stop the spread of the malware in the network, change the passwords of all email and online services, take back-ups, scan for malware and viruses in the backups and reinstall the Operating System.

References

- <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/05/transparent-tribe-infra-and-targeting.html>
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/06/apt_group_sends_spea.html%E2%97%8F%20
- <https://www.proofpoint.com/sites/default/files/proofpoint-operation-transparent-tribe-threatinsight-en.pdf%E2%97%8F%20>
- https://www.thaicert.or.th/downloads/files/A_Threat_Actor_Encyclopedia.pdf%E2%97%8F%20
- <https://cysinfo.com/cyber-attack-targeting-cbi-and-possibly-indian-army-officials/%E2%97%8F%20>
- <https://www.seqrte.com/blog/operation-honey-trap-apt36-targets-defence-organizations-inindia/%E2%97%8F%20>
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